Abstract: The paper proposes a novel principle of rational self-locating belief that refers to the epistemic agent's causal context. The principle is motivated and applied to some of the most-discussed problems of self-locating belief including the Doomsday Argument, the Serpent's Advice scenario, the Presumptuous Philosopher problem, the Sleeping Beauty problem, and the problem of confirmation in the Everett interpretation. It is shown to yield plausible verdicts in all these cases.
Introduction
In a typical problem of self-locating belief, observers figure out their rational credences as regards what the world is like by properly taking into account the available self-locating evidence, i.e. the available evidence as to where and when they exist, and as who among all observers. Whether some bit of self-locating information is available to an agent can have considerable impact on her rational credences concerning matters non-self-locating. Problems of self-locating belief have received increasing attention by philosophers in recent years. The most widely discussed such problems include the Doomsday Argument (Gott 1993 , Leslie 1996 , the Presumptuous Philosopher problem (Bostrom 2002a) , the Sleeping Beauty problem (Elga 2000) , and the problem of confirmation in the Everett interpretation of quantum mechanics (Lewis 2007) . (For overviews and comparative assessments of different versions of these problems, see, for example, (Bostrom 2002a) and (Bradley 2012 ) and references therein. All these problems are reviewed and discussed in the present paper.)
The present paper adopts the following set-up for problems of selflocating belief: in the first step, a set of hypotheses as to how the world might be is chosen and probabilities P r() are assigned to them. These can be relative frequencies, objective chances or other probabilities arrived at on grounds of systematic considerations (examples will follow below). In what follows, I refer to the probabilities P r() as non-anthropic input probabilities: contrary to what Carter's anthropic principle (Carter 1974 ) reminds us to do, they do not yet take into account any constraints on possible observations that arise from the fact that what is observed must be compatible with the existence of observers. In the second step, the situation of some (hypothetical) epistemic agent is considered who either has or lacks some bit of self-locating information that might be relevant to her rational assessment of the hypotheses at issue; finally, in the third step, it is asked whether the agent's rational credence cr(A) with respect to some (non-self-locating) proposition A is the same as the non-anthropic input probability P r(A) and, if not, how it differs. In other words, in problems of self-locating belief as set up here the challenge is to compute an epistemic agent's rational credence cr(A), given the amount of self-locating information that the agent has, from the non-anthropic input probability P r(A). As we will see, in many examples this challenge is far from trivial.
What makes problems of self-locating belief so fascinating is that any suggested prescription for connecting the non-anthropic input probabilities and the rational credences that appears to work well for some problems seems to run into trouble for others. For instance, the so-called selfindication assumption (SIA) (Bostrom 2002a, 66) , which can be interpreted as a prescription of how to link input probabilities and rational credences, delivers an intuitively plausible verdict on the Doomsday Argument, but it also delivers a catastrophically implausible verdict on the Presumptuous Philosopher problem. (Both are explained in detail below.)
The main idea of the present approach to connect the non-anthropic input probabilities and the rational credences is the following: typically, observers can take over the non-anthropic input probabilities as their rational credences by identifying the two, but exceptions occur whenever observers are disoriented about their place in the causal order of observers, in which cases they have to correct for effects that result from their being so disoriented. I propose a causal principle of self-locating belief that makes this idea more specific and precise. The results obtained from this principle for the problems mentioned are: (i) that the Doomsday Argument is invalid, (ii) that the presumptuous philosopher is presumptuous (i.e. his reasoning to be rejected), (iii) that the thirder view is correct in the standard version of Sleeping Beauty, and (iv) that the Everett interpretation does not receive automatic confirmation by arbitrary data.
Unlike the present work, most recent systematic work on rational selflocating belief adopts a diachronic perspective that develops and evaluates updating policies for rational credences in the light of newly won (or lost) self-locating evidence. (For examples of suggested policies, see (Bradley 2011 , Briggs 2010 , Cozic 2011 , Kim 2009 , Meacham 2008 , Moss 2012 , Schulz 2010 , Schwarz 2012 , Stalnaker 2008 , Titelbaum 2008 .) The present work differs in that it focuses on the relation between the nonanthropic input probabilities and the rational credences, which is not that between prior and posterior credences given newly acquired (or lost) self-locating evidence. Working with non-anthropic input probabilities has the advantages that, first, no prior credences are needed from which to compute the looked-for posteriors and that, second, the question can be set aside which observer stages (possible world "centres", in the terminology to be used) are successive stages of one and the same observer. At the same time, working with non-anthropic input probabilities has the drawback that uniquely determined non-anthropic input probabilities may not be available or that there may be several candidate relevant non-anthropic input probabilities between which it is difficult to choose. Given these relative advantages and drawbacks, the present approach should be seen not as rival to diachronic approaches but as complementary, having its own comparative assets and problems, which may be more or less pronounced depending on the scenario under consideration.
The structure of the remaining sections of this paper is as follows: Section 2 presents the formal basis of the approach to be used. Sections 3 and 4 introduce two simple (conflicting) candidate principles of how to obtain the rational credences from the non-anthropic input probabilities. Both are shown to correspond to internally coherent styles of reasoning that may be applied to various problems of self-locating belief (roughly speaking, the first to reasoning that avoids the SIA, the second to reasoning that uses it), both are also shown to have highly counterintuitive consequences. In view of these counterintuitive consequences and in response to them, Section 5 motivates and proposes the above-mentioned causal principle of how to obtain the rational credences from the non-anthropic input probabilities. Section 6 applies this principle to the Doomsday Argument and the Presumptuous Philosopher problem and shows that it yields plausible recommendations for them, Section 7 applies it to the Sleeping Beauty problem, Section 8 to the Everett interpretation of quantum mechanics. Finally, Section 9 closes the paper with an outlook on challenges that remain.
The formalism
The formalism to be used here is a standard Lewisian one that identifies propositions with sets of possible worlds. Uncentred and centred propositions are distinguished. An uncentred proposition p (scare quotes are omitted for the sake of easy readability) corresponds to the collection of (uncentred) possible worlds V , W , X, ..., in which it is true, and the uncentred worlds themselves are equivalent to the propositions that describe them completely. For a proposition p that corresponds to the collection V , W , X, ... of worlds, p is represented as the disjunction V ∨ W ∨ X ∨ ... . Many uncentred possible worlds harbour observers, and these have their own individual perspectives within the worlds they live in. It is common to refer to the distinct points of perspective inside some world as its centres.
There is no fixed and determinate criterion of what counts as a centre. Typically what one takes to be a centre depends on the problem and context at issue. For many purposes, one identifies the centres of a world with the conscious observers who inhabit it, but sometimes a more fine-grained distinction into observer-moments (Bostrom 2002a) , i.e. stages of one and the same observer at different times, is preferable. In the problem cases to be discussed, there are well-established conventions as to how to individuate centres as observers or observer-moments. I adopt these conventions for convenience, but it should be kept in mind that the choice of centres has nontrivial implications and is often a decisive move in setting up a problem of self-locating belief. (The challenge of choosing an appropriate class of centres in a possible world is the more generic reference class problem's manifestation in the theory of rational self-locating belief.)
A centred possible world V i corresponds to an uncentred world V with one centre picked out and denoted by the variable i. Centred propositions correspond to collections of centred possible worlds, which means that they can be represented in the form V i ∨ W j ∨ X k ∨ ... (where any uncentred world V can appear with different indices several times).
Following David Lewis (see Lewis 1979 and, for an application to a problem of self-locating belief, Lewis 2001), I allow that uncentred possible worlds may be decomposed into maximally unspecific centred possible worlds, i.e. worlds V are equated with maximal disjunctions of centres V i in the form V = V 1 ∨ V 2 ∨ ..., where V 1 , V 2 , ... are the centres of the world V . Only those uncentred worlds that contain some centre (or centres) can be decomposed into centred ones.
A simple credence-prior link
Self-locating evidence is evidence as to which of the centres V 1 , V 2 , ... in some uncentred world V one might be. Let us start by asking what the rational credence of being the centre V i j is, given that one is one of the centres V i 1 , V i 2 , ... V in . To tackle this question, let us assume that there is a credence function cr( ) from which the rational credence of being V i j , given that one is either V i 1 or V i 2 or ... or V in (while not knowing which), is obtained as the conditional probability cr(
A straightforward, and in many cases plausible, answer is that one should be indifferent as to which of the centres V i j on the right hand side of the "|" one is, i.e. one should have equal credence in being any of these centres. This suggestion is expressed in the following formal principle IND (where "IND" stands for "indifference"):
where i j is one of the i 1 , ..., i n .
Indifference principles in the spirit of IND are defended by various authors, for example by Vilenkin, Bostrom and Elga and applied in a variety of contexts where self-locating evidence matters. Vilenkin offers his principle of mediocrity (Vilenkin 1995) as a principle of typicality in cosmological contexts; Bostrom strives for more generality with his self-sampling assumption (Bostrom 2001 (Bostrom , 2002a according to which " [o] ne should reason as if one were a random sample from the set of all observers in one's reference class", leaving open the reference class to be used (Bostrom 2002a, 57) ; finally, Elga (Elga 2004 ) defends "indifference" as a weak form of IND, which applies only if the psychological states of the V i j are subjectively indistinguishable.
Even the weakest of the indifference principles-Elga's-has been subjected to a sustained critique in the literature (for example in (Weatherson 2005) and (Schwarz 2015 , Section 7)), and there is little reason to suppose that IND is always attractive: there are certainly circumstances where one's evidence leaves it open which centre among several one is and where it is rational not to be indifferent as to which one it is. Nevertheless, I suggest that IND be accepted for the purposes of this paper as a working assumption. There are at least three reason why this seems to be a good idea: first, IND delivers plausible consequences in some simple scenarios such as Bostrom's dungeon (Bostrom 2002a, 59f ., see also his discussion of two scenarios due to Leslie in Bostrom 2002a, 62f.) , and it is not easy to come up with a similarly powerful, less controversial principle to recover these consequences while rejecting IND; second, in the examples to be discussed, as will be pointed out, deviations from IND would have to be radical in order to lead to verdicts that differ qualitatively in interesting ways; and, third, due to its simplicity IND is worthy of exploration in itself, even if it turns out to be nothing more than a first-order approximation to a more general and more satisfying principle.
Applicability of IND is not confined to situations where one is certain that the actual uncentred world is V . Using cr(
where N V is the total numbers of centres in V . As demonstrated by Vilenkin, Bostrom, Elga and many others, GenIND can be used to derive very interesting results concerning rational self-locating belief. As announced in the introduction, the present paper uses a set-up for problems of self-locating belief that is based on what I call non-anthropic input probabilities P r( ), assigned to the uncentred worlds V , W , X, ... Typically, these probabilities are either objective chances (such as those of quantum events or of outcomes of coin tosses and other random events) or (suitably idealised) relative frequencies. As it turns out, in all the scenarios to be discussed here there are some probabilities that suggest themselves for being treated as the non-anthropic input probabilities. Examples of nonanthropic input probabilities to be used are: a healthy couple's probability of conceiving a child when having intercourse, the probability that some asteroid with well-defined boundary conditions will collide with the earth and extinguish human life, the probability of a fair coin to come up Heads, and, in the final example to be discussed, an agent's prior degree of belief in the Everett interpretation as based on philosophical reasoning while ignoring empirical data.
In all the scenarios to be discussed, the main challenge is to determine the rational credences from the non-anthropic input probabilities by adequately considering the available self-locating evidence. One way to approach this challenge is by asking under which conditions the non-anthropic input probabilities just are the rational credences, given the available self-locating evidence. The most straightforward possible answer to this question that I discuss here is that the non-anthropic input probabilities directly translate into the rational credences when one's self-locating information is maximally unspecific in that
where "MU" stands for "maximally unspecific". According to MU, if all that one knows about one's location is that one might just be any of the centres in the worlds V , W , X, ..., then one's rational credence with respect to V is the non-anthropic prior P r(V |V ∨ W ∨ X ∨ ...) itself. Though simple and apparently natural, the principle MU has some very counterintuitive consequences. In particular, in combination with GenIND it gives rise to the notorious Doomsday Argument in its different versions. Let us review a simple version of this argument: consider two hypotheses H 1 and H 2 as to how many observers are ultimately going to have existed (N 1 according to H 1 , N 2 according to H 2 ). To simplify matters, let us focus on human observers and assume that they alone are the elements of our reference class (see Bostrom 2001 , note 1, for considerations on what happens if we drop this assumption). Next, assume that you are the n-th observer ever to exist, where n < N 1 and n < N 2 , i.e. you are certain to be either H 1,n or H 2,n . Finally, let us assume that N 1 N 2 in that H 1 predicts that a fatal asteroid strike will lead to an untimely end of humanity, so that much less human beings will have lived according to H 1 than H 2 . Nonanthropic input probabilities P r(H 1 ) and P r(H 2 ) are assigned to H 1 and H 2 based on information about the relative frequencies of asteroid strike in some (hopefully) well-chosen reference class of asteroids.
Given these assumptions, what are your rational credences concerning H 1 and H 2 ? Assuming that H 1 and H 2 exhaust the space of possibilities to be considered (in that cr(H 1 ) = cr(H 1 |H 1 ∨ H 2 ) and cr(H 2 ) = cr(H 2 |H 1 ∨ H 2 )) we obtain
where Bayes' theorem has been used in the first line, the definition of conditional probability in the transition from the first to the second, GenIND in the transition from the second to the third, and MU in the transition from the third to the fourth. Thus, based on MU and GenIND we obtain the result that your relative rational credences with respect to the hypotheses H 1 and H 2 are inversely proportional to the numbers of observers N 1 and N 2 that exist according to them. A smaller total number of observers ever to have lived is confirmed over a larger one. The effect persists if more hypotheses H 3 , H 4 , ... that other numbers of observers are considered. It also persists if modest deviations from GenIND are allowed or the reference class of observers (i.e. centred worlds) is modestly altered. Furthermore, for any choice of reference class an analogously structured argument can be constructed with suitable hypotheses H 1 , H 2 . Some version of the Doomsday Argument looms for any choice of reference class and hypotheses considered.
However, the conclusion of the Doomsday Argument is implausible, and wildly differing diagnoses have been offered in the literature as to what might be wrong with it. 1 To determine what exactly makes it so bizarre it is useful to consider one more scenario that is similar to the Doomsday Argument but highlights the counterintuitive consequences of MU in combination with GenIND in an even more drastic manner. The example is due to Bostrom, who calls it "Serpent's Advice":
Eve and Adam, the first two humans, knew that if they gratified their flesh, Eve might bear a child, and if she did, they would be expelled from Eden and would go on to spawn billions of progeny that would cover the Earth with misery. One day a serpent approached the couple and spoke thus: "Pssst! If you embrace each other, then either Eve will have a child or she won't. If she has a child then you will have been among the first two out of billions of people. Your conditional probability of having such early positions in the human species given this hypothesis is extremely small. If, one the other hand, Eve doesn't become pregnant then the conditional probability, given this, of you being among the first two humans is equal to one. By Bayes's theorem, the risk that she will have a child is less than one in a billion. Go forth, indulge, and worry not about the consequences!" (Bostrom 2001, 366) The serpent's reasoning is correct, given MU and GenIND, in complete analogy with the Doomsday Argument. To see this, suppose that Adam and Eve consider only two hypotheses (possible worlds): one, H 1 , according to which they remain the only two humans ever to have lived, and one, H 2 , according to which N > 10 9 humans are ultimately going to have lived. Adam's self-locating evidence tells him that he is the first observer ever to have existed, i.e. either H 1,1 or H 2,1 . Using this information, he can compute the ratio between his rational credences with respect to H 1 and H 2 in analogy to Eq. (1) as:
Let us assume, for the sake of simplicity, that the probability of getting pregnant after intercourse is approximately 1/2, which translates into P r(H 1 ) ≈ P r(H 2 ) ≈ 1/2. Accordingly, P r(H 1 ) and P r(H 2 ) approximately cancel out and the result of Eq. (2) becomes N/2 ≈ 10 9 . Thus, if we grant the serpent the use of MU and GenIND, we have to concur that Adam and Eve should consider the pregnany risk as completely negligible (or, perhaps to their chagrin, their abilities to have children as weirdly reduced). The main source of the counterintuitive character of the results expressed in Eqs. (1) and (2) is the factor
, in the third line of Eq. (1) and N 2 in Eq. (2). To eliminate it, one may either look for an alternative to GenIND or for one to MU. As already announced, I will keep GenIND as a working assumption and look for an alternative to MU. In the following section I discuss the prospects for identifying rational credences with the non-anthropic priors given maximally specific self-locating evidence.
An alternative principle
In this section I discuss a straightforward alternative to MU that elegantly avoids the Doomsday Argument and the serpent's advice. Unfortunately, as it turns out, this alternative has highly counterintuitive consequences on its own. In fact, as we shall see, it inherits the implausibility of the disastrous self-indication assumption (SIA) (Bostrom 2002a, 66) .
The alternative to MU is that the non-anthropic prior translates into the rational credence conditional on maximally specific ("MS") self-locating evidence:
for arbitrary centred possible worlds
.. is to be understood as containing exactly one (arbitrary) centred world V i for each uncentred world V and, for each uncentred world that has no centre, that uncentred world itself. Thus, according to MS the nonanthropic prior P r(V ) translates into the credence that one rationally ought to have with respect to V in a situation where, for each world V , W , X, ... that might be the actual world, one can exclude all but one centre V i , W j , X k , ... as one's own ("actual" one). Considered by itself, the principle MS is implausible: why should the non-anthropic prior-which one might characterise as the probability arrived at by ignoring the self-locating evidence-give the rational credence in a situation when one has maximally specific self-locating information? Nevertheless, it is useful to consider the ramifications of MS as it provides the most straightforward way to get rid of the implausible conclusions of the Doomsday Argument and the Serpent's Advice scenario. Appealing to MS, we directly obtain the desired result:
This means that the ratio of the rational credences when having the selflocating evidence "I am the n-th observer" (expressed as "H 1,n ∨ H 2,n )") is precisely that of the non-anthropic priors, just as one would have expected. However, besides being implausible in itself, the principle MS has the unwelcome feature that, as already remarked, its consequences are the same as those of the self-indication assumption in that it states that the rational credence in some hypothesis is proportional to the number of observers that exist according to it. This can be seen as follows (where I use cr(V ) as a shorthand for cr(V |V ∨ W ∨ X ∨ ...) and similarly for P r(V )):
where the first line uses MS, the second line uses the definition of conditional probability, and the third line uses GenIND (where N V is the number of centres in V and analogously for N W , N X etc.). Evaluating Eq. (4) for two uncentred worlds V and W one obtains
which implies, implausibly, that one's rational degree of belief in a possible world is proportional to the number of observers that exist in it. This is equivalent in its consequences with Bostrom's SIA. (Bostrom does not rely on the distinction between rational credences and non-anthropic priors as the present paper does and, accordingly, formulates the SIA somewhat differently, as an assumption about rational priors. For practical purposes Eq. (4) and the SIA are equivalent.) The SIA's unacceptable consequences are highlighted especially pointedly in the Presumptuous Philosopher scenario:
It is the year 2100 and physicists have narrowed down the search for a theory of everything to only two remaining plausible candidate theories, T 1 and T 2 (using considerations from super-duper symmetry). According to T 1 the world is very, very big but finite and there are a total of a trillion trillion observers in the cosmos. According to T 2 , the world is very, very, very big but finite and there are a trillion trillion trillion observers. The super-duper symmetry considerations are indifferent between these two theories. Physicists are preparing a simple experiment that will falsify one of the theories. Enter the presumptuous philosopher: "Hey guys, it is completely unnecessary for you to do the experiment, because I can already show to you that T 2 is about a trillion times more likely to be true than T 1 !" (Whereupon the presumptuous philosopher explains the Self-Indication Assumption.) (Bostrom 2002a, 124) The philosopher's claim seems indeed presumptuous, and following his recommendation would clearly be irrational. 2 Generally speaking, given nonanthropic priors of similar size for two hypotheses, it does not seem rational to prefer one over the other with near certainty just on grounds that it postulates vastly more observers. This, however, is exactly what the principle MS bluntly recommends. By way of contrast, the principle MU recommends cr(T 1 )/cr(T 2 ) = P r(T 1 )/P r(T 2 ) (i.e. non-anthropic priors correspond directly to the rational credences), which seems much more plausible when applied to the Presumptuous Philosopher scenario.
To sum up the present investigation until now: The simple principle MU is natural and attractive at first sight, but it runs into trouble in Serpent's Advice and leads to the Doomsday Argument. The alternative principle MS avoids these problems but entails the SIA and, therefore, leads to the disastrous conclusion of the presumptuous philosopher. Arguably, what we need is a principle that coincides with MU in the Serpent's Advice scenario and the Doomsday Argument and with MS in the Presumptuous Philosopher scenario, ideally without radically changing the Bayesian framework that is used. 3 In the following section I propose a principle that seems to fulfil these expectations.
A causal principle
What might be the relevant difference between the Doomsday Argument and Serpent's Advice on the one hand and the Presumptuous Philosopher scenario on the other, so that MS seems to give the correct answer in the former and MU in the latter?
I suspect that the origin of our motivation to treat the two differently lies along the following lines: in the Presumptuous Philosopher scenario, we compare two possible worlds (corresponding to the two theories T 1 and T 2 ) that are "ready-made" in the sense that no conceivable action might contribute to make one rather than the other one actual. Thus, the credences cr(T 1 ) and cr(T 2 ) are about which one is and always has been actual. In Serpent's Advice, in contrast, Adam and Eve embark on considerations as to which world theirs is most likely to become, partly influenced by their actions. For them, whether H 1 or H 2 becomes true (i.e. whether they will have any offspring) depends causally on the actions they perform (or don't perform). Similarly, for humans in the Doomsday Argument who live before the asteroid strikes (or fails to strike), whether H 1 or H 2 holds is a question of which world theirs is to become in the future.
Let us consider the implications of these considerations for observers pher challenge and Bostrom andĆirković 2003 for a (to my mind convincing) rebuttal. Leitgeb 2010 offers an illuminating alternative version of the Presumptuous Philosopher scenario that compares hypotheses which differ on the number of observers by virtue of differing on the temporal extent of the universe (more specifically, on the number of expansion/contraction processes that the universe goes through).
whose self-locating information is maximally unspecific, e.g., in the Doomsday Argument, observers whose self-locating evidence is
The considerations just offered suggest that observers with such maximally unspecific self-locating information are much more seriously disoriented in the Doomsday Argument and in Serpent's Advice than in the Presumptuous Philosopher scenario: in the former, they are unaware of whether they are among those who can potentially influence whether H 1 or H 2 is true or, in contrast, among those whose existence depends on H 2 being true. In particular, they are unaware of whether they are among those whose existence is potentially dependent on actions that, given who they might as well be, they themselves might in principle be able to perform. In contrast, observers in the Presumptuous Philosopher scenario whose selflocating information is maximally unspecific are not similarly disoriented because T 1 and T 2 are competing cosmological theories of which one is true and the other one false once and for all, such that there is no way of how any observer might conceivably influence whether T 1 or T 2 holds. 4 Now to the central suggestion to be made in this paper. The main idea is the following: typically (most of the time in our everyday lives), observers can take over the non-anthropic priors as their rational credences; exceptions occur whenever they are disoriented about their place in the causal order of observers, in which cases they have to correct for effects that result from their being so disoriented. Let us try to make this suggestion formally precise inasmuch as it admits being made so. 5 Let us introduce variables V α , W β , X γ , ... (with Greek letters for the indices throughout) to denote complete collections of centres V i , V j , V k , ..., and similarly for W , X, etc., between which no directed (direct or indirect) causal links exist. For collections V α and V α from the same uncentred world V there are no constraints or limitations on joint members. I assume that whenever there are directed causal links between two centres V i and V j from the same world it is at least in principle possible either for V i to prevent V j 4 One can of course modify the Presumptuous Philosopher problem and set it up such that, by assumption, it becomes at least in principle possible for observers to causally influence whether T1 or T2 holds. As I argue below, a good claim can be made that in such versions of the problem the presumptuous philosopher's MS-style reasoning is no longer presumptuous at all and the correct solution is analogous to the one in the Doomsday Argument.
5 All present talk involving such notions as "causal structure", "causal order", "causal context" and "causal links" is meant to be understood as metaphysically non-committing, in particular not as presupposing causal realism. If one accepts a non-realist view of causation such as, for example, Huw Price's causal perspectivalism (Price 2007 ), one will have to interpret the terminology accordingly, for example, by tying causal relations and structure to the causal perspective that happens to be adopted by the epistemic agent. Making epistemic rationality perspectival in this sense might be a surprising move, but there is no reason why it should be in principle problematic. (Thanks to an anonymous referee for highlighting this implication of causal perspectivalism as applied to the present proposal) from existing or for V j to prevent V i from existing. 6 In theory, it may often be difficult to decide whether for some pair of centres V i and V j there are directed (direct or indirect) causal links between them, for example if candidate links exist that are for some contingent reason unexploitable for manipulative purposes. In such cases, there is no clearcut answer to the question of whether there is some V α to which V i and V j jointly belong. As a consequence, in these cases recommendations based on the principle to be formulated will be ambiguous and depend on the chosen interpretation of the causal relation between V i and V j .
In practice, however, determining whether there are causal links between any two centres V i and V j is typically straightforward. For instance, in Serpent's Advice, Adam is causally linked to both Eve and (indirectly) to his descendants (if there are any). As a consequence, the observers "Adam in H 1 " and "Adam in H 2 " are each individually already of the form V α . In the Presumptuous Philosopher scenario, an example of a collection V α is one which includes the presumptuous philosopher himself as well as a number of spacelike separated distant observers who are all causally isolated both from him and from each other. Worlds V which do not contain any observers are by definition themselves of the form V α .
For the sake of simplicity I restrict attention to scenarios where within each possible world V the number of centres is the same within each collection V α , V β , V γ , ... from the same uncentred V . This suffices to address (simple versions of) the scenarios discussed in the literature. In the absence of this assumption, the principle I am going to propose is no longer consistent with GenIND, so either it or GenIND will have to go in settings where it fails. Fortunately, in all the scenarios mentioned and in those to be discussed the assumption that all V α , V β , V γ , ... for the same V have the same number of members seems viable. (Dropping it is a natural next step to be taken in future work, as the concluding section will argue.) After these preliminaries, here is the principle I propose ("CP" stands for "causal principle"):
.. of causally isolated observers from distinct worlds V , W , X, .... If we include a different collection α from one world, say V , we obtain a new
. Similarly, if we simultaneously and/or alternatively replace β by β and γ by γ , we arrive at further instances of CP.
To understand the ramifications of CP, it is useful to compare it with MU and MS. Crucially, CP reduces to MU if all centres in each world V , W , X, ... are causally isolated from each other, for in that case V α = V , W β = W , X γ = X etc. On the other hand, CP reduces to MS if all centres in each world lie along one and the same directed chain of causal links between observers, for in that case V i = V α for each world and each i. The next section traces the ramifications of CP when applied to the problems of selflocating belief discussed above by highlighting these connections with MU and MS.
Applications
The principle CP is designed to reproduce the recommendation of MS in the Doomsday Argument and in Serpent's Advice and that of MU in the Presumptuous Philosopher scenario. This section investigates whether and, if so, how it does so.
Uncontroversially, in the Serpent's Advice scenario, directed (direct or indirect) causal links exist between Adam and Eve on the one hand and their descendants, i.e. all the later observers. In accordance with the remarks made at the end of the previous section, this reproduces the recommendation derived from MS: Adam and Eve may not legitimately assume that the risk of Eve's getting pregnant is negligible, so Adam's rational credences, knowing that he is the first observer ever to have existed, are cr(H 1 |H 1,1 ∨ H 2,1 ) = P r(H 1 ) and cr(H 2 |H 1,1 ∨ H 2,1 ) = P r(H 2 ).
Similarly, observers in the Doomsday scenario whose birth rank n it consistent with both H 1 and H 2 may in principle causally influence later observers, so their rational credences, according to CP, are cr(H 1 |H 1,n ∨ H 2,n ) = P r(H 1 ) and cr(H 2 |H 1,n ∨ H 2,n ) = P r(H 2 ). So, according to CP the Doomsday Argument fails.
Evidently, the recommendation that we wish to receive from CP for the Presumptuous Philosopher scenario is that the presumptuous philosopher's attitude is indeed presumptuous and that MU, rather than MS, leads to the right result here. However, the application of CP is not straightforward here since the story, as told by Bostrom or Leitgeb (see fn. 2), does not come with a specification of the causal links that exist according to T 1 and T 2 , respectively.
To extract some recommendation from CP, let us stipulate that there is one civilisation of observers according to T 1 and a trillion of qualitatively identical copies of that civilisation according to T 2 in such a way that all those copies are causally isolated from each other. There are different ways of how causal isolation can arise: for example, it can be due to the fact that the spatial distances between civilisations are so large that causal influences, travelling no faster than the velocity of light, cannot possibly connect them; or it can be due to the fact that, as in Leitgeb's modified Presumptuous Philosopher scenario (Leitgeb 2010) , different civilisations occur in subsequent expansion and contraction cycles of an ever expanding and contracting cyclic universe, where causal influences are cut off (or are unexploitable for practical purposes as a matter of principle) by the periodically occurring big crunch/big bang-stages.
Considering this scenario, let T 1,α and T 2,β be collections of observes that exist according to T 1 or T 2 , respectively, whose members are all causally isolated from each other. As a consequence of the assumptions just made, the collection T 2,β contains one trillion times more observers than T 1,α . Applying the principle CP yields
By assumption, the number of observers in T 1,α differs from that of those who exist according to T 1 by the same factor as the number of observers in T 2,β differs from that of those who exist according to T 2 . As a consequence, we obtain
in conformity with our intuitions and with MU, in contrast with the implausible result derived from MS (or the SIA). But what are the recommendations of CP with respect to the Presumptuous Philosopher scenario if we allow (direct or indirect) causal links between the different civilisations that exist according to T 2 ? According to CP the existence of such causal links may have a nontrivial influence on the rational credences, and-one may ask-shouldn't the existence of such causal links be completely irrelevant for the rational credences?
In scenarios where the observers that exist according to T 1 and T 2 are causally linked among each other in complicated ways it is very difficult to check the plausibility of the recommendations given by CP, for we will typically not have any clear intuitions about the rational credences. However, there is an illuminating and important example that should be discussed, namely, where the class of observers that exist according to T 1 corresponds one-to-one to a subclass of the class of observers that exist according to T 2 , while the vast majority of observers that exist according to T 2 (all those that are not in the subclass) are causal descendants (or, in an alternative scenario, ancestors) of those in the subclass. This constellation is realised, for instance, in a scenario where essentially all observers are causally linked among each other and T 1 and T 2 agree on the history of the world up to (or after) some time t, such that according to T 1 there are no observers after (before) t, whereas, according to T 2 , the vast majority of observers live after (before) t, all of them causal descendants (ancestors) of those who live before (after) t.
Once the Presumptuous Philosopher scenario is set up in this way, the recommendation given by CP is no longer the same as before. In fact, CP now recommends that all those observers who live before (after) t and are aware of it should align their rational credences with the non-anthropic priors, whereas those who are unaware of whether they live before or after t should prefer the theory T 2 , which predicts a larger total number of observers, as if based on MS. Thus, with respect to this scenario, where T 1 and T 2 agree on the history before (after) t and disagree on it afterwards (before), the principle CP endorses the presumptuous philosopher's recommendation of the theory T 2 that predicts more obervers.
Luckily, this result, far from being worrisome for CP, speaks in favour of its plausibility. This is easily seen by noting that the scenario just described is essentially that of the Doomsday Argument: there as well the hypotheses at issue agree on the history of humanity up to some time t, one of them (H 1 ) predicts the extinction of humanity at t, whereas the other (H 2 ) predicts many more observers. Introducing causal links between the observers that exist according to T 2 along the lines just discussed has taken us from the original Presumptuous Philosopher problem to the scenario of the Doomsday Argument. The principle CP advises us to treat these cases differently, which-given our intuitive verdicts that the Doomsday Argument fails and the presumptuous philosopher's reasoning is presumptuous-is a virtue of CP, not a problem for it.
Sleeping Beauty
No other problem of self-locating belief has provoked the same amount of activity among epistemologists as the Sleeping Beauty problem. In its canonical exposition due to Adam Elga it reads as follows:
Some researchers are going to put you to sleep. During the two days that your sleep will last, they will briefly wake you up either once or twice, depending on the toss of a fair coin (Heads: once; Tails: twice). After each waking, they will put you to [sic] back to sleep with a drug that makes you forget that waking. When you are first awakened, to what degree ought you believe that the outcome of the coin toss is Heads? (Elga 2000, 143) Opinions are split over the correct answer. The two candidate rational credences for Beauty ("you", in Elga's example) with respect to "Heads" are 1/2 and 1/3, both of which have substantial support in the literature. The divide over the correct answer to the Sleeping Beauty problem is reflected in the fact that the principles MU and MS produce exactly those diverging answers, and it is interesting to see which recommendation is given by CP.
To begin with, denote the three possible observer-moments (commonly called HEADS-Monday, TAILS-Monday, and TAILS-Tuesday) by H 1 , T 1 and T 2 , and assume that the coin toss is indeed fair in that P r(H) = P r(T ) = 1/2 for the (objective) outcome probabilities. It is natural to use these probabilities as the non-anthropic priors. The self-locating evidence Beauty has at her disposal when awakening is maximally unspecific, i.e. H 1 ∨ T 1 ∨ T 2 , which results in her rational credence
according to MU and in
according to MS (where the consequence of MS Eq. (5) has been used together with cr(
. Thus, the divide between MU and MS corresponds neatly to that between "halfers" and "thirders" on Sleeping Beauty. Let us first consider the standard version of the problem where the two observer-moments T 1 and T 2 are treated as distinct stages of one and the same observer on two subsequent days (Monday and Tuesday). There are plenty of causal links from T 1 to T 2 . For instance, if Beauty decides to have her hair dyed on Monday, she will, as a causal effect, have dyed hair if and when she is woken on Tuesday. It is true indeed that, in the story as told by Elga, Beauty on Monday has no practical means of affecting whether she is woken again on Tuesday. Nevertheless, we can imagine the experimenters asking her on any day-as a routine question-whether they may carry on with the experiment and wake her again (that is, if it is Monday and the coin falls TAILS), or whether, say, she feels sick and prefers that the experiment be aborted. Introducing such a question does not do violence to the story or transform it into one that calls for a totally different assessment. No such question could be asked if there were no causal links between T 1 and T 2 at all, in which case the Tuesday awakening could not possibly be prevented (or somehow influenced) on Monday.
Given the existence of causal links from T 1 to T 2 , the principle CP coincides in its recommendation with MS:
which, when combined with GenIND, yields the thirder answer
This result is attractive: even though the 1/2-answer has some notable proponents (such as Lewis 2001 and Bradley 2012) , the 1/3-answer seems to remain the dominant one in the literature and, as it seems to me, for good reasons. Among the main independent arguments in its favour are the following two that go back to Elga: first, if the experiment is repeated many times, approximately 1/3 of the awakenings are HEADS-awakenings; second, on the 1/2-view, if Beauty is told that it is Monday, her rational credence with respect to HEADS turns to 2/3 by conditionalization. 7 As it does not seem to matter whether the coin is tossed on Sunday or Monday evening, this means that Beauty, fully oriented about her (temporal) location, should assign 2/3 to the outcome of a coin toss yet to be tossed being HEADS, which differs from its objective chance and seems difficult to accept. 8
The most important objection against the 1/3-view is that it is difficult to see how its supporters can avoid commitment to the SIA and, thereby, however grudgingly, to the presumptuous philosopher's disastrous reasoning. The approach based on CP avoids this problem in that, as discussed in the previous section, its answer to the Presumptuous Philosopher problem (modulo complications that arise from the presence/absence of causal links) is that the presumptuous philosopher is indeed presumptuous, that is, as if based on MU (halfer-style reasoning). Thus, grounding thirdism on CP rather than MS avoids the only major significant challenge to being a thirder about the standard version of Sleeping Beauty.
Besides the standard version of the Sleeping Beauty problem just considered there is also a fission version, where if TAILS comes up, Beauty undergoes fission into two simultaneous observer-moments T 1 and T 2 . In the fission scenario, if both are indeed created in in the same joint fission procedure, it is hard to see how any of the two post-fission Beautys could prevent the other one from being created in the first place. (One might immediately kill the other after the fission procedure has been performed, but then both will have coexisted at least for a very short while.) If this is the correct take on the fission version, the principle CP recommends the halfer answer in it by dictating cr(H|H 1 ∨ T 1 ∨ T 2 ) = P r(H) = 1/2. Thus, on an interpretation of the fission version where the two post-fission Beautys cannot causally influence each other (at least not when starting to exist) the 7 Some halfers, the so-called double-halfers (e.g. Bostrom 2007 , Meacham 2008 , Cozic 2011 ) dispute this. Meacham's position as espoused in (Meacham 2008 ) is especially interesting because he arrives at it on the basis of a proposed general principle of diachronic self-locating belief called compartmentalized conditionalization. This framework, however, is confronted with serious difficulties (see, for instance, (Titelbaum 2008 , Section 2.7) and (Bradley 2011, Section 9) , and in (Meacham 2010) he has abandoned it.
8 See (Elga 2000) for these arguments and (Lewis 2001) for David Lewis' response supporting the 1/2-answer; for a condensed systematic overview of the debate about Sleeping Beauty, see ; for an important recent defence of the 1/3-answer based on a general Bayesian framework that applies to self-locating belief, see (Titelbaum 2013, Chapter 9) .
principle CP treats the temporal and the fission versions differently.
Is this difference in how CP treats the standard, "temporal", version of Sleeping Beauty on the one hand and the fission version on the other hand plausible? There are indeed important disanalogies between the temporal and the fission version: for example, while there is only one copy of Beauty in the temporal version, woken twice if TAILS comes up, there are two copies of her in the fission version if TAILS comes up, each woken only once. As a consequence, there is no obvious analogue to the long-run frequency argument in the fission scenario because it is unclear which of the persons that are woken in different runs of the experiment are the same. Furthermore, in the fission scenario it is not an option to perform the decisive coin toss on Monday evening, for at that time the fission procedure must have been made if it is to be made. As a consequence, Elga's second argument-which relies on the possibility of the coin being tossed on Monday evening-does not carry over to the fission scenario as well and there is considerably less motivation for thirdism in the fission version from the start. 9
The Everett interpretation
The standard stochastic interpretation of quantum theory (SI) teaches that in each case where a measurement is performed exactly one of the possible outcomes is realised. The probabilities for the various possible outcomes are given by their Born weights, which in turn are computable by the formalism of quantum theory. In contrast to the SI, the Everett interpretation of quantum theory (EI) teaches that in each case where a measurement is performed all possible outcomes of the measurement are realised, but in different branches of a vast Everettian "multiverse", each branch associated with its distinctive Born weight.
Since the EI is designed to reproduce the empirical predictions of the SI in all but very special experimental circumstances that are extremely hard to bring about, one would expect that evidence which confirms (or disconfirms) the SI typically also confirms (or disconfirms) the EI to the same degree. There are various issues about how empirical confirmation is accommodated in the EI, and here I focus only on the most dramatic worry, namely, that, since the EI predicts that all possible outcome really occur, any arbitrary outcome confirms it, in contrast with the SI, which makes very specific predictions. If this were true, it would mean that, as noted by Bradley, "[t] he Ancients could have worked out that they have overwhelming evidence for [EI] merely by realizing it was a logical possibility and observing the weather." (Bradley 2012, 159) Clearly the case for the EI cannot possibly be as simple as that, and the reasoning that leads to trivial confirmation of the EI must be somehow fallacious.
However, as pointed out in (Lewis 2007) , while the naive confirmation view of the EI is obviously inadequate, it seems as if endorsing the 1/3-view on Sleeping Beauty commits one to it. 10 Put as simply as possible, the argument for this claim is this: according to the 1/3-view on Sleeping Beauty, it is rational for Beauty to prefer TAILS over HEADS when awaking, related to the fact that there are more awakenings in the TAILS-world than in the HEADS-world. Applied to the dispute between the SI and the EI, an analogous line of thought leads to the result that we should prefer the EI over the SI, just on grounds that it predicts more observer-moments, corresponding to all possible measurement outcomes, which according to the EI are in fact all real measurement outcomes. Fortunately, the principle CP provides a rationale for not drawing this unattractive conclusion and for retaining thirdism while rejecting naive confirmation of EI.
To apply CP to the SI/EI-dispute in a simple example, let us consider the measurement setup studied in (Lewis 2007) and in (Bradley 2012 ): a spin-1/2 particle prepared in a state where the Born weights for the possible measurement results +1/2 and −1/2 of, say, spin in z-direction, are identical, i.e. BW (+1/2) = BW (−1/2) = 1/2. There are four possible observermoments to be considered, namely EI + , EI − , SI + and SI − , which can be read as "I am in the Everett branch where the outcome is +1/2", "I am in the Everett branch where the outcome is −1/2", "The SI holds and the outcome is +1/2", and "The SI holds and the outcome is −1/2", respectively. There are no causal links between any two of these observer-moments: occurrences of SI + and SI − are mutually exclusive, and both are incompatible with EI + and EI − . The latter two correspond to distinct branches of reality, and it is impossible for an observer detecting the outcome +1/2 in the "up-branch" to influence the situation of an observer detecting the outcome −1/2 in the "down-branch" (and conversely). In particular, whether or not, say, the observer-moment EI − exists at all is not something that the observermoment EI + can causally influence. 11 10 Bradley endorses Peter Lewis' reasoning together with its conclusion, arguing that it is to be welcomed by the Everettian (Bradley 2012, Section 2.1). Wilson disputes that Everettians should happily embrace the 1/2-view but also argues that they may escape committing themselves to it by relying a principled distinction between chancy and ignorance-based input probabilities (Wilson 2014) . This is an interesting proposal, which, in the light of the close conceptual ties between chance and causation, is perhaps not unrelated to the present one. See (Bradley 2015) for criticism that it would need to overcome.
11 According to some versions of the Everett interpretation, split branches may in principle recombine. Cross-branch causal influences may occur in these cases and, if we follow CP, may have a non-trivial impact on the rational credences in more complicated situa-If we plug in the observation that EI + , EI − , SI + , SI − are not causally linked and denote our non-anthropic prior assigned to the Everett interpretation (on whatever systematic and/or interpretive grounds we have arrived at it) by P r(EI), the principle CP agrees with the principle MU in that it yields cr(EI|EI ∨ SI) = cr(EI|EI + ∨ EI − ∨ SI + ∨ SI − ) = P r(EI) .
To see the consequences of this result, assume that a measurement of spin in z-direction is performed, and the outcome is, say, +1/2. As emphasised by Bradley, it is crucial to note here that the evidence gained by the experimentalist is not merely "There exists a +1/2-branch" (which would correspond to EI + ∨ EI − ∨ SI + ), but the more specific "I am in a +1/2-branch" (which corresponds to EI + ∨ SI + ). Thus, the experimentalist's rational credence after having registered the result +1/2 is cr(EI|EI + ∨ SI + ). The crucial assumption made by the Everettians is that the rational credences of being in the up-or down-branch are given by the Born weights of the outcomes +1/2 and −1/2. In other words, Everettians assume that the rational credences are cr(EI + |EI) = BW (+1/2) and cr(EI − |EI) = BW (−1/2), where BW (+1/2) and BW (−1/2) are the corresponding Born weights. Given this assumption (it is highly controversial whether Everettians are justified in availing themselves of it), the following result can be derived by using CP's instance Eq.Â (13):
The crucial assumption made by the Everettians is that the rational credences of being in the up-or down-branch are given by the Born weights of the outcomes +1/2 and −1/2. In other words, Everettians assume that the rational credences are cr(EI + |EI) = BW (+1/2) and cr(EI − |EI) = BW (−1/2), where BW (+1/2) and BW (−1/2) are the corresponding Born weights. 12 Given this assumption (of which it is highly controversial whether Everettians are justified in making it), the following result can be derived by using CP's instance Eq. (13): cr(EI|EI + ∨ SI + ) = cr(EI + ∨ SI + |EI) · cr(EI) cr(EI + ∨ SI + ) = BW (+1/2) · P r(EI) BW (+1/2) = P r(EI) .
Bayes' Theorem has been used in the first line and Eq. (13) in the second line. In addition, it has been assumed that no further interpretations besides SI tions. 12 According to Vaidman 1998 , this is an instance of the more general basic (not further justifiable) Everettian principle that rational credences should be assigned in conformity with the Born weights conceived of as measures of existence. According to Wallace 2012 (Part II in particular) , in contrast, decision-theoretic considerations can be used to provide deeper justifications of this use of the Born weights.
and EI need to be considered: cr(EI) = cr(EI|EI ∨SI). The result Eq. (14) is reassuring. It means that evidence that the outcome is +1/2 (or −1/2) does not automatically lead to confirmation of the Everett interpretation over the stochastic interpretation, exactly as it should.
As indicated, the remaining challenge for the Everettians is to justify that the rational credence of being in some branch really coincides with the associated Born weight. In the example considered, Everettians must justify cr(EI + |EI) = BW (+1/2) and cr(EI − |EI) = BW (−1/2) as the rational credences for arbitrary Born weights BW (+1/2) and BW (−1/2). Matters are highly subtle here. To highlight just one of the complications that arise, consider a scenario where only the observer who witness the result +1/2 survives, i.e. where the only possible (post-measurement) observermoments are SI + and EI + . 13 In the formalism used here EI is decomposed as EI = EI + ∨ EI − if both EI + and EI − exist. However, if there is no observer-moment EI − , the decomposition reduces to EI = EI + , which yields cr(EI + |EI) = 1, differing from the Born weight BW (+1/2) = 1. If Everettians are committed to this conclusion, their interpretation is empirically inadequate, which is bad news for them. In response to this difficulty, Everettians might opt for amending the formalism by adding ghost observermoments in unpopulated branches such as EI − even if they do not really exist. It seems difficult to judge whether this move can be made in a nonad hoc way without delving much more profoundly into how the Everett interpretation should be fleshed out in detail.
On the more optimistic side, however, let us recapitulate the main moral of this section, which is that CP allows to combine thirdism about the temporal version of Sleeping Beauty with a view according to which the Everett interpretation is not automatically confirmed by arbitrary empirical data. The additional question of whether the Everett interpretation is empirically equivalent with the SI whenever it should be-including less simple examples than the one considered here-is much more difficult and beyond the scope of this paper.
Concluding remarks
I have motivated and defended CP as a promising recipe for obtaining the rational credences from the non-anthropic priors in the scenarios considered. My main goal, however, is not to establish CP as the ultimately correct way to to this-due to its in-built limitations and vagueness it almost certainly isn't-but to direct our attention to the causal contexts of observers as potentially relevant for the correct solutions to problems of self-locating belief.
Future work that takes up this recommendation could elaborate on the present discussion in at least the three ways: first, it may try to find a version of CP that applies to scenarios where indifference principles like IND and GenIND are implausible from the start-for example scenarios where collections V α and V α that belong to the same uncentred V differ in the number of members. Second, they may try to put CP (or a refined version) on a firmer philosophical basis, for example by recovering it in the language of causal graphs (Pearl 2000 , Spirtes et al. 1993 or by investigating it in the language of the Principal Principle (Lewis 1986) . 14 Third, they may want to explore the consequences of CP (or a refined version) when applied systematically to a wider class of problems of self-locating belief, appropriately categorized, including, for example, the problem of empirical confirmation in a multiverse where the constants of nature are different in the various subuniverses. 15
